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67 
PERMITTED TO SUFFER FOR 
EXPERIENCE: SECOND CIRCUIT USES 
“PRIMARY BENEFICIARY” TEST  
TO DETERMINE WHETHER UNPAID 
INTERNS ARE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE 
FLSA IN GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT 
PICTURES, INC. 
Abstract: On January 25, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., vacated the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York’s order, which found that unpaid interns were 
“employees” under both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York 
Labor Law. The Second Circuit also vacated the district court’s certification of a 
New York class and conditional certification of a nationwide FLSA collective. In 
so doing, the Second Circuit held that the proper inquiry for determining whether 
an intern is an “employee” under the FLSA is whether the intern rather than the 
employer is the “primary beneficiary” of the engagement. This Comment argues 
that the Second Circuit’s reasoning was based on a misunderstanding of the reali-
ty of unpaid internships and thus failed to address the common attributes of the 
modern internship. This Comment then proposes a set of revised factors for 
courts to consider, which better represent internship realities. 
INTRODUCTION 
The word “intern” can convey many meanings to a potential employer.1 
Notwithstanding the vagueness of the word, an internship entry on a résumé is 
an important, if not requisite, stepping stone to gainful employment.2 Until the 
middle of the twentieth century, however, internships only existed in the medi-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Intern, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 632 (9th ed. 1991) (defining 
“intern” as “an advanced student or graduate usu. in a professional field (as medicine or teaching) 
gaining supervised practical experience (as in a hospital or classroom)”); ROSS PERLIN, INTERN NA-
TION: HOW TO EARN NOTHING AND LEARN LITTLE IN THE BRAVE NEW ECONOMY 23 (2012) (de-
scribing the “ambiguity” of the word “intern”). 
 2 Andrew Mark Bennett, Comment, Unpaid Internships & the Department of Labor: The Impact 
of Underenforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act on Equal Opportunity, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 293, 296 (2011) (writing that the “consensus” is that internships are 
necessary to gaining white-collar employment); Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceil-
ing: Unpaid Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1531, 1536 (2010) (writing that students and employers view internships as a necessary 
means to be competitive in the employment marketplace). 
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cal field, where students spent a year or two working in a hospital before enter-
ing the medical profession.3 Today, internships in a wide range of professional 
fields are commonplace for students in undergraduate and graduate school, and 
even after graduation.4 Colleges encourage students to pursue internships, 
some require internship completion as a prerequisite to graduate, and some 
schools incorporate internships directly into their curriculum through “cooper-
ative” education programs.5 The current estimate is that as many as half of all 
internships in the United States are unpaid, and the number of unpaid interna-
tional internships is growing.6 
                                                                                                                           
 3 PERLIN, supra note 1, at 30 (writing that apprenticeships in the medical profession existed for 
centuries, but not until the advent of major medical schools did the formal internship program become 
popular). 
 4 Id. at xiv (highlighting the fact that seventy-five percent of the 9.5 million college students in 
the United States graduate with at least one completed internship); Becca Lundberg, 5 Reasons a 
Postgraduate Internship May Work for You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 19, 2015, 9:32 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2015/08/19/5-reasons-a-postgraduate-
internship-may-work-for-you [https://perma.cc/WX49-HNNC] (describing the benefits of a post-
graduate internship); see also Craig J. Ortner, Note, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Reali-
ties: The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2617 (1998) (noting that law stu-
dents take unpaid positions with judges during law school in order to increase their chances of getting 
hired after graduation); cf. Christopher Keleher, The Perils of Unpaid Internships, 101 ILL. B.J. 626, 
628 (2013) (noting that it would be likely that “given the weight of law school student debt” a law 
student would be willing to take an unpaid position at a law firm in order to gain firm experience). 
 5 See William G. Bissell & H. Russell Hettinger, Cooperative Legal Education at Northeastern 
University, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 210, 211 (1977) (discussing the “learning by doing” approach at North-
eastern University School of Law); Jessica A. Magaldi & Olha Kolisnyk, The Unpaid Internship: A 
Stepping Stone to a Successful Career or the Stumbling Block of an Illegal Enterprise? Finding the 
Right Balance Between Worker Autonomy and Worker Protection, 14 NEV. L.J. 184, 202 (2013) (dis-
cussing colleges’ “complicity” in the rise in unpaid interns); Ross Perlin, Editorial, Interns, Victimized 
Yet Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/opinion/interns-
victimized-yet-again.html?_r=0 (discussing the fact that some colleges require students to complete 
internships); Career and Cooperative Education, NE. UNIV., http://www.northeastern.edu/coop/ 
[https://perma.cc/2NWU-4WCY] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (describing the cooperative education 
curriculum at Northeastern University); Cooperative Education, DREXEL UNIV., http://drexel.edu/
difference/co-op/ [https://perma.cc/8NG7-74LL] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (describing the coopera-
tive education curriculum at Drexel University); Co-op Experience, GA. INST. OF TECH., http://www.
life.gatech.edu/co-op-experience [https://perma.cc/KN6V-H8L2] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (describ-
ing the cooperative education curriculum at Georgia Tech); Internships, B.C., http://www.bc.edu/
offices/careers/jobs/internships.html [https://perma.cc/L49G-ZYE2] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (rec-
ommending that Boston College students hold at least two internships during their four years as an 
undergraduate); Intro to Co-op, ROCHESTER INST. OF TECH., https://www.rit.edu/emcs/oce/student/
intro-to-co-op [https://perma.cc/R5C4-LN89] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) (describing the cooperative 
education curriculum at Rochester Institute of Technology). 
 6 See Keleher, supra note 4, at 627 (describing the increasing number of interns); Curiale, supra 
note 2, at 1535 (noting that internships in the U.S. are “on the rise”); Steven Greenhouse, Internships 
Abroad: Unpaid, With a $10,000 Price Tag, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/08/education/edlife/the-10000-unpaid-global-internship.html (noting that the number of in-
ternational unpaid internships has increased in recent years); Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, 
Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html 
[hereinafter Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern] (referencing a 1992 study, which found that only seven-
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In 2016, in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt III), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced the question of whether unpaid 
interns should be classified as “employees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”).7 Such a classification would 
make unpaid interns entitled to at least minimum wage compensation.8 In va-
cating the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had been improperly classi-
fied as unpaid interns rather than as paid employees, the Second Circuit adopt-
ed a test that focuses on which party, the employer or the intern, is the “prima-
ry beneficiary” of the relationship, and held that additional factual develop-
ment was needed to determine which party primarily benefitted from the en-
gagement.9 
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit’s “primary beneficiary” test 
is overly particularized and subjective and is based on a misunderstanding of 
the realities of modern internships.10 Part I reviews the social and legal aspects 
of unpaid internships, the status of the law governing internships, and the dis-
trict court’s holding in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt I).11 Part II 
explores the Second Circuit’s holding in Glatt III that the primary beneficiary 
test should be used to determine an intern’s employment status under the 
FLSA.12 Part III argues that the primary beneficiary test is based on a misun-
derstanding of unpaid internships and proposes a revised set of factors for 
courts to consider in their determination of employee status under the FLSA 
and similar state labor laws.13 
                                                                                                                           
teen percent of graduating college students had completed an internship). At the same time that stu-
dents are being encouraged to pursue unpaid internships, the price of college admission continues to 
rapidly rise. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION 
STATISTICS 2013, at 8 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015011.pdf [https://perma.cc/N52V-
EPNA] (describing the rise in the price of a college degree). Between the 2002 and 2012 academic 
years, prices for undergraduate tuition, room, and board at public institutions rose thirty-nine percent, 
and prices at private nonprofit institutions rose twenty-seven percent, after adjustment for inflation, to 
an average yearly cost of $25,784. Id. 
 7 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt III), 811 F.3d 528, 531 (2d Cir. 2016); see 29 
U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (establishing minimum wage requirement); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
12, § 142-2.1 (2013) (same). The Second Circuit issued its original decision on July 2, 2015. Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt II), 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015), amended and superseded by 
Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 531. The court, however, amended and superseded its original opinion on Janu-
ary 25, 2016. Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 531. 
 8 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (establishing a minimum wage for all employees); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. 
& REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.1 (same). 
 9 Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 541. 
 10 See infra notes 69–100 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–46 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 47–63 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 69–100 and accompanying text. 
70 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:E. Supp. 
I. SLAVING AWAY FOR “EXPERIENCE” 
As a result of a highly competitive employment market, interns descend 
on cities across the country every year to gain work experience.14 Students of-
ten trade the possibility of a low-skill, paid summer job for internship experi-
ence, which has been referred to as a “de facto form of currency.”15 In return 
for offering internship programs, employers receive free labor and an oppor-
tunity to evaluate potential employees in a workplace environment.16 Even at 
major corporations, internships are often completed for college credit, rather 
than for traditional compensation.17 Although unpaid interns may sometimes 
gain work experience and training, their protections under the law are un-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Julia Morpurgo, Note, Should Class Be Dismissed? The Advantages of a One-Step Class 
Certification Process in Unpaid Intern FLSA Lawsuits, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 774 (2014) (writ-
ing that many companies assure interns that instead of being paid, the interns will make contacts, 
enhance their résumé, and generally “get a foot in the door”); see also PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW 
RES. CTR., YOUNG, UNDEREMPLOYED AND OPTIMISTIC: COMING OF AGE, SLOWLY, IN A TOUGH 
ECONOMY 6 (2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/young-underemployed-and-
optimistic.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH9V-7BGV] (reporting that only 54.3 percent of young adults be-
tween ages eighteen to twenty-four were employed in 2011); Ashley G. Chrysler, Comment, All 
Work, No Pay: The Crucial Need for the Supreme Court to Review Unpaid Internship Classifications 
Under the FLSA, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (noting that the recent economic recession has 
led to an increased number of interns); Madiha M. Malik, Note, The Legal Void of Unpaid Intern-
ships: Navigating the Legality of Internships in the Face of Conflicting Tests Interpreting the FLSA, 
47 CONN. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2015) (noting that high unemployment rates have driven students to 
pursue internships to break into the workforce). 
 15 Ezra H. Stoller & Lily C. Sugrue, Unpaid Internships: A Priceless Experience?, HARV. CRIM-
SON (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/3/unpaid-internships-experience/ 
[https://perma.cc/LNG4-V8X2]. 
 16 David L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 241 (1998) (noting that internships “benefit employers in a 
myriad of ways”). 
 17 See Keleher, supra note 4, at 627 (noting that interns “are ultimately volunteers who agree to 
work for free”); Sara Lipka, Would You Like Credit With That Internship?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(D.C.) (May 9, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Would-You-Like-Credit-With/65434/ [https://
perma.cc/6NE7-XAXF] (writing that colleges view academic credit as an appropriate substitute for 
monetary compensation). Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee hires 2500 
interns every year, the retailer Target hires approximately 1000 interns each year, and since launching 
the Disney College Program in 1980, Disney has hired over 50,000 interns. PERLIN, supra note 1, at 6, 
35–36; see Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, supra note 6 (reporting that employers posted 643 unpaid 
internships on Stanford University’s job board in 2010, which is triple the 174 internships posted in 
2008). As a result of the rapid expansion of the internship market, there is arguably a widening eco-
nomic gap between those who can afford to work in expensive cities for little to no pay, and those 
who cannot. See Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 206 (describing the socio-economic effects of 
the growth of unpaid internships); Bennett, supra note 2, at 296–97 (same); Greenhouse, The Unpaid 
Intern, supra note 6 (arguing that the growth in unpaid internships favors “well-to-do and well-
connected students, speeding their climb up the career ladder”). This economic gap becomes apparent 
upon graduation when employers favor applicants who have internship experience. See PERLIN, supra 
note 1, at xiv (discussing the fact that candidates with internship experience are more likely to be hired 
than candidates without experience). 
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clear.18 Section A provides an overview of the status of the law regarding un-
paid internships.19 Section B reviews the facts and procedural posture of Glatt 
v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. in the district court.20 
A. Status of the Law Governing Unpaid Internships 
The FLSA regulates the majority of employment in the United States and 
mandates a minimum wage, maximum working hours, and provides other pro-
tections to workers.21 A worker must meet the FLSA’s definition of “employ-
ee” to be guaranteed these protections.22 The FLSA broadly defines “employ-
ee” as anyone “employed by an employer.”23 “Employ” is defined as “to suffer 
or permit to work,” and an “employer” is “any person acting directly or indi-
rectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”24 Because the 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1569 (finding that attempts to make employment regulations 
pair with unpaid internships have proved challenging, in part because of a lack of holding from the 
U.S. Supreme Court); Curiale, supra note 2, at 1531 (arguing that the law regarding unpaid intern-
ships is “convoluted and unclear”); see also Keleher, supra note 4, at 628 (writing that the FLSA does 
not use the word “intern” once). 
 19 See infra notes 21–33 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 34–46 and accompanying text. 
 21 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 218(c) (2012). Congress enacted the FLSA to correct “the existence . . . 
of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for 
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). An employee 
cannot give up his or her right to minimum wage because a waiver of such right would “nullify” the 
public policy purpose of the FLSA. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 
740 (1981) (holding that to waive the right to minimum wage would “thwart the legislative policies 
[the FLSA] was designed to effectuate”). 
 22 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (providing the definition of “employee”); Malik, supra note 
14, at 1189 (writing that if an intern does not meet the definition of “employee” under the FLSA, the 
employer does not have to abide by the law); see also O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 
1997) (affirming district court’s holding that unpaid intern subjected to repeated sexual abuse in the 
workplace was not entitled to protections because she was not an “employee” under the FLSA); Evans 
v. Wash. Ctr. for Internships & Acad. Seminars, 587 F. Supp. 2d 148, 149 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding 
plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims failed because she was not an “employee” within the meaning of 
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, which substantially mirrors the FLSA’s definition of 
“employee”). There has also been significant dispute as to whether independent contractors should be 
classified as “employees” under the FLSA. See Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Eco-
nomic Realities”: The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Inde-
pendent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 239–40 (1997) (discussing the difference between employ-
ees and independent contractors); see also Jennie Davis, Note, Drive at Your Own Risk: Uber Violates 
Unfair Competition Laws by Misleading Uberx Drivers About Their Insurance Coverage, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 1097, 1105 (2015) (describing the criticism faced by Uber regarding the company’s categoriza-
tion of drivers as independent contractors); Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers and Others in the Gig 
Economy Take a Stand, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/
uber-drivers-and-others-in-the-gig-economy-take-a-stand.html (discussing the on-going dispute be-
tween Uber drivers and the company over whether drivers should be classified as employees rather 
than independent contractors). 
 23 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
 24 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (defining “employ”); id. § 203(d) (defining “employer”); see Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (stating that the term “employ” has “striking 
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FLSA does not carve out an exception for unpaid internships, the legality of 
withholding compensation from interns turns solely on whether interns meet 
the FLSA’s definition of “employee.”25 
In the past few years, unpaid interns have begun challenging the legality 
of their unpaid internships under the FLSA and similar state labor laws by fil-
ing lawsuits against their former employers seeking unpaid wages.26 The U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, has not heard a case closely on point since 1947 
when it decided Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.27 In Portland Terminal, the 
Court held that unpaid participants in a railroad company’s one-week training 
program were not employees under the FLSA and were not entitled to com-
pensation.28 The Court found it persuasive that the railroad company received 
“no immediate advantage” from any work done by the trainees.29 
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued Fact Sheet No. 
71: Internship Programs Under The Fair Labor Standards Act (“Fact Sheet 
                                                                                                                           
breadth” under the FLSA); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., ADMINISTRATOR’S INTER-
PRETATION NO. 2015-1 (July 15, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/AI-
2015_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S37P-FW3M] (explaining that the “suffer or permit” language was in-
tended to be broadly interpreted and was added to curb child labor law violations). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently viewed the FLSA liberally to further the public policy purpose of the legisla-
tion. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985) (noting that the 
Court has liberally interpreted the FLSA). 
 25 Malik, supra note 14, at 1189 (noting that if an intern is an “employee” then he or she is enti-
tled to minimum wage but arguing that it is hard to determine an intern’s employee status due to a 
lack of judicial clarity and the “broad language” of the FLSA). 
 26 See, e.g., Tart v. Lions Gate Entm’t Corp., No. 14-cv-8004 (AJN), 2015 WL 5945846, at *2–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2015) (approving settlement and finding plaintiffs alleged facts showing common 
internship policies); Klein v. Octagon, Inc., No. 14. Civ. 6770(AT), 2015 WL 5821629, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (denying plaintiff-intern’s motion for conditional collective action certifica-
tion); Ballinger v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4036(HBP), 2014 WL 7495092, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2014) (seeking unpaid wages and class certification for interns in suit against 
Condé Nast); Mark v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 13-cv-4347 (AJN), 2014 WL 4058417, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014) (seeking unpaid wages and class certification for interns in suit against 
large media corporation); Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. (Glatt I), 293 F.R.D. 516, 521–22 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (seeking unpaid wages and class certification for interns in suit against movie distri-
bution company), vacated, Glatt III, 811 F.3d 528; Wang v. Hearst Corp., 293 F.R.D. 489, 490 
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2013) (seeking unpaid wages and class certification for interns in suit against 
magazine), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 617 F. App’x 35 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 27 Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1564 (noting that no U.S. Supreme Court case since the 1947 case 
of Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. provides guidance on the issue of interns’ legal employment 
status); see Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 153 (1947) (holding trainees in railroad 
company program were not entitled to compensation). 
 28 Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 153 (interpreting the FLSA’s definitions of “employ” and “em-
ployee,” the language of which are the same as today). The Court noted that in addition to providing 
“no immediate advantage” to the railroad company, the trainees actually “impede[d]” its operation. Id. 
at 150, 153. The trainees in the seven-day program were first sent to the railroad yard crew for super-
vision and instruction through observation, and were then soon permitted to do actual work under the 
scrutiny of the yard crew. Id. at 149. 
 29 Id. at 153. 
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No. 71”), which provided informal guidance to employers in the for-profit sec-
tor on when an unpaid intern might be considered an employee under the 
FLSA.30 Fact Sheet No. 71 includes a six-factor test that was based on the 
same criteria used by the Court in Portland Terminal.31 Fact Sheet No. 71 in-
structs that an employment relationship does not exist if all of the six factors 
are met.32 Legislation addressing unpaid internships has yet to occur.33 
B. Glatt I in the District Court 
In 2011, four interns filed suit against Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 
(“Searchlight”), a movie distribution company, and its parent company, alleg-
ing that the companies violated the FLSA and NYLL by classifying the plain-
tiffs as unpaid interns instead of as paid employees.34 Two of the interns, Eric 
Glatt and Alexander Footman, worked in the production office of the Search-
                                                                                                                           
 30 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET NO. 71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1–2 (2010), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs71.pdf [https://perma.cc/V552-D2R9] [hereinafter FACT SHEET NO. 71]. The DOL guidelines 
apply only to employers who engage in a business for profit. Id. at 1. Non-profits may hire unpaid 
interns as volunteers and are not subject to the six-factor test. Id. 
 31 See Malik, supra note 14, at 1196 (observing that Fact Sheet No. 71 “merely restates” the rea-
soning from Portland Terminal). The six factors are: 
(1) the internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the em-
ployer, is similar to training which would be given in an educational environment; (2) 
the internship experience is for the benefit of the intern; (3) the intern does not displace 
regular employees, but works under close supervision of existing staff; (4) the employer 
that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the in-
tern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded; (5) the intern is not nec-
essarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and (6) the employer and 
the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in the in-
ternship. 
Id. The New York Department of Labor has also issued a fact sheet on unpaid internships, which uses 
the same six factors as Fact Sheet No. 71 but adds five more factors. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF LA-
BOR, WAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNS IN FOR-PROFIT BUSINESSES 1–2 (2011), https://www.
labor.ny.gov/formsdocs/factsheets/pdfs/p725.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS5Q-3XG4]. 
 32 FACT SHEET NO. 71, supra note 30, at 1. 
 33 Morpurgo, supra note 14, at 781; see Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1564–65, 1569 (noting that no 
legislation has specifically addressed the issue of unpaid internships); Curiale, supra note 2, at 1546 
(arguing that employer compliance with employment law is nearly impossible because no legislation 
specifically addresses unpaid internships). 
 34 Glatt I, 291 F.R.D. at 521–22. The definition of “employee” under NYLL does not differ sig-
nificantly from that of the FLSA. Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.14 (2013) 
(“Employee means any individual employed, suffered or permitted to work by an employer . . . .”), 
with 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (“‘[E]mployee’ means any individual employed by an employer.”). 
Although the plaintiffs alleged violations of the California Unfair Competition Law (“CAUCL”), the 
district court found that claim time-barred. Glatt I, 293 F.R.D. at 524. Plaintiffs did not appeal the 
court’s holding on that issue. See generally Glatt III, 811 F.3d 528 (omitting discussion of the 
CAUCL). 
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light film, Black Swan.35 Another intern, Eden Antalik, worked in the Search-
light corporate offices in New York City.36 When Glatt started working on 
Black Swan, he was enrolled in a graduate program, but the school did not of-
fer him credit for the Black Swan internship.37 Footman had recently graduated 
from college and was not enrolled in a degree program at the time of his in-
ternship.38 Due to the school requirements, in order to graduate, Antalik had to 
complete an internship program.39 All of the interns were unpaid.40 
Glatt and Footman moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds 
that they were employees covered by the FLSA and NYLL and that Search-
light was their employer.41 Antalik moved for certification of a New York class 
under NYLL and conditional certification of a nationwide collective under the 
FLSA.42 On June 11, 2013, the district court granted partial summary judgment 
for Glatt and Footman and found that they were employees under the FLSA 
and NYLL.43 In particular, the district court found that Glatt and Footman’s 
internship duties did not require any special training.44 The court stressed that 
any educational benefits Glatt and Footman may have received were the result 
of “having worked as any other employee works,” not of internships specifi-
cally designed to provide educational value.45 The district court also certified 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Glatt I, 293 F.R.D. at 522. 
 36 Id. Kanene Gratts, a fourth intern and plaintiff, worked on production of the film 500 Days of 
Summer. Id. Gratts was not a plaintiff in the original action but the plaintiffs filed an amended com-
plaint, adding Gratts to the suit. Id. at 523. The district court however, held that Gratts’ claims were 
time-barred because her internship ended before August 2008 and because she was not entitled to 
equitable tolling, which the plaintiffs did not appeal. Id. at 525. Thus, Gratts is not a subject in the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Glatt III. See generally Glatt III, 811 F.3d 528 (omitting discussion of 
Kanene Gratts). 
 37 Glatt III, 811 F.3d 528 at 531. Glatt worked at Searchlight as an intern from December 2, 2009, 
through February 2010 in Black Swan’s accounting department. Id. He worked five days per week 
from approximately 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Id. From March 2010 to August 2010 he interned a second 
time in Black Swan’s post-production department, during which time he worked from approximately 
11:00 a.m. until 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. two days per week. Id. 
 38 Id. at 532. 
 39 Id. at 533. Antalik began work around 8:00 a.m. each day and worked from August 2009 until 
mid-May 2010. Id. 
 40 See Glatt I, 293 F.R.D. at 522. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 539. In finding that Glatt and Footman were employees of Searchlight under the FLSA and 
NYLL, the district court applied the six factors enumerated in Fact Sheet No. 71, but did not require that 
all six factors be present to establish that the interns were not employees, which departed from the DOL’s 
guidance. Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 535. Instead, the district court balanced the factors, finding they weighed 
in favor of an employee determination. Id. 
 44 Glatt I, 293 F.R.D. at 534. 
 45 Id. 
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Antalik’s New York NYLL class and conditionally certified her nationwide 
FLSA collective.46 
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION: PRIMARY BENEFICIARY TEST 
CONTROLS THE INQUIRY 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s orders and remand-
ed the case for the application of its newly introduced “primary beneficiary” 
test.47 The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reliance on the six 
factors in Fact Sheet No. 71.48 Instead of simply applying Fact Sheet No. 71 to 
the facts of the case, the Second Circuit created a new, non-exhaustive set of 
seven factors to determine whether the intern or the employer is the “primary 
beneficiary” of the relationship.49 Under the court’s test, if an unpaid intern is 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 539. When a court certifies a class action, it allows one or more plaintiffs to sue as repre-
sentative parties on behalf of all members of the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The FLSA provides 
that a suit “may be maintained against any employer . . . in any Federal or State court . . . by any one 
or more employees for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situat-
ed.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012), invalidated by Mich. Corr. Org. v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 774 F.3d 895 
(6th Cir. 2014) (holding that, without a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could not 
remedially authorize suits against the states under the FLSA, which does not pertain to the private 
employer issue in Glatt). In order to certify the New York collective, Antalik bore the burden of 
showing that the class met the requirements of Rule 23, which are numerosity, commonality, typicali-
ty, and adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). In addition to finding that the above 
requirements were met, the court also had to find that “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3). 
 47 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt III), 811 F.3d 528, 531 (2d Cir. 2016). The Second 
Circuit first issued an opinion in this case in July 2015 and then amended and superseded that opinion 
in January 2016. Id.; Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt II), 791 F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 
2015), superseded and amended by Glatt III, 811 F.3d 528. The appeal in Glatt II was argued in tan-
dem with Wang v. Hearst Corp., in which the Second Circuit also reversed and remanded on the same 
issues as in Glatt III. Wang v. Hearst Corp., 617 F. App’x 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 48 Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 536 (declining to rely on Fact Sheet No. 71 because it is a “distillation” of 
Portland Terminal, and an agency does not have authority to interpret a court decision). The court 
noted that at most, Fact Sheet No. 71 was entitled to persuasive deference under the 1944 U.S. Su-
preme Court holding in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. Id.; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944) (holding that the amount of deference given to an administration’s guidance depends on “all 
those factors which give it power to persuade”). 
 49 See Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 536–37; see also Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 
1199, 1211–15 (11th Cir. 2015) (adopting and applying the Second Circuit’s “primary beneficiary” 
test to remand suit brought by unpaid student nurse anesthesiologists). The seven factors are: 
(1) The extent to which the intern and the employer clearly understand that there is no 
expectation of compensation. Any promise of compensation, express or implied, sug-
gests that the intern is an employee—and vice versa. (2) The extent to which the intern-
ship provides training that would be similar to that which would be given in an educa-
tional environment, including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by edu-
cational institutions. (3) The extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal 
education program by integrated coursework or the receipt of academic credit. (4) The 
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the primary beneficiary of the arrangement, they are correctly classified as a 
nonemployee under the FLSA, and vice versa.50 
The Second Circuit rejected the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs 
were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York 
Labor Law (“NYLL”) because the district court limited its inquiry to the six 
factors in Fact Sheet No. 71.51 The court held that because Fact Sheet No. 71 
was essentially a distillation of the factors used by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1947 in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., the Fact Sheet did not “reflect” the 
“central feature of the modern internship,” which the court held was the 
strength of the nexus between the internship and the intern’s formal educa-
tion.52 
According to the Second Circuit, the “primary beneficiary” test first fo-
cuses on what the intern receives in exchange for his or her work.53 The Sec-
ond Circuit also saw the test as one that provides courts with the flexibility to 
examine the economic reality of the arrangement between the intern and the 
company.54 The court reversed the district court because it held that the six-
                                                                                                                           
extent to which the internship accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by 
corresponding to the academic calendar. (5) The extent to which the internship’s dura-
tion is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with beneficial 
learning. (6) The extent to which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, 
the work of paid employees while providing significant educational benefits to the in-
tern. (7) The extent to which the intern and the employer understand that the internship 
is conducted without entitlement to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship. 
Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 536–37. 
 50 See id. at 537 (describing the possible outcome of the primary beneficiary test and noting that 
“[n]o one factor is dispositive and every factor need not point in the same direction”); Chrysler, supra 
note 14, at 1581 (explaining the “primary beneficiary” test). 
 51 Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 535. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 536. 
 54 See id. The “primary beneficiary” test incorporates aspects of tests used by courts in various 
circuits in similar contexts. Chrysler, supra note 23, at 1575–76 (describing multiple tests); see, e.g., 
Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 331 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding genuine dispute of material fact as to the 
“economic reality” of the plaintiff’s situation where plaintiff alien alleged that she was a domestic 
service worker covered by the FLSA); Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch. Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 
525–26 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a “rigid” test in favor of a “primary benefit” approach); Reich v. 
Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 1993) (using a “totality of the circumstanc-
es” test to find firefighter trainees not employees under FLSA); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 
1209 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding the determination hinged on which party “principally benefited” from 
the engagement); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying an “eco-
nomic reality” test to determine that nontaxed nurses employed by health-care service were employ-
ees, not independent contractors, under FLSA); Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 
470 (11th Cir. 1982) (“It is well-established that the issue of whether an employment relationship 
exists under the FLSA must be judged by the ‘economic realities’ of the individual case.” (quoting 
Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1979))); Donovan v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 271–72 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that trainees of defendant employer’s edu-
cational training program were “employees” under the FLSA by addressing the benefit received by 
both parties); Wirtz v. Wardlaw, 339 F.2d 785, 788 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding workers were “employ-
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factor test from the Fact Sheet attempted to conform Portland Terminal’s par-
ticular facts to all workplaces.55 The court held that the test does not conform 
to all workplaces because an intern enters into their engagement with the ex-
pectation of receiving educational benefits, which is not true of all employ-
ment scenarios.56 
After determining that the district court applied an inaccurate test, the 
Second Circuit went on to discuss the district court’s certification of Antalik’s 
New York NYLL class and conditional certification of her nationwide FLSA 
collective.57 To proceed as a class action, Antalik bore the burden of proving 
the predominance requirement of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 
23”).58 In order to meet this requirement, “questions of law or fact common to 
class members [must] predominate over any questions affecting only individu-
al members . . . .”59 The Second Circuit noted that the predominance inquiry is 
met if the questions of law or fact could be answered through “generalized 
proof, and if these particular issues are more substantial than the issues subject 
only to individualized proof.”60 The Second Circuit held that Antalik failed to 
meet this requirement because the issue of an intern’s legal employment status 
is a “highly context-specific inquiry” when considering whether the predomi-
nance inquiry is met.61 For comparison, in September, 2015, in Klein v. Octa-
gon, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found 
that the plaintiff intern did not present sufficient evidence to meet the “general-
ized proof” standard in Glatt III.62 Less than a month later, however, in Octo-
ber 2015 in Tart v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp., the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York granted preliminary approval of a class and 
collective action settlement and found that the plaintiff interns provided sub-
                                                                                                                           
ees” under FLSA and finding determinative that employer’s interests were served by the plaintiffs’ 
work and that the employer “benefited from their labors”); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 
U.S. 722, 730 (1947) (finding independent contractors “employees” under the FLSA when examining 
the “circumstances of the whole activity”). 
 55 Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 537–38. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 538–40. 
 58 Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 538; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 60 Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 538 (quoting In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 118 
(2d Cir. 2013)). 
 61 Id. at 539. The Second Circuit, however, did note that a court may consider evidence of an 
internship program as a whole, rather than that of a singular intern’s experience. Id. at 537. In the 
Second Circuit’s original opinion, the court noted that the “proper test” is one that recognizes that 
determining an intern’s employment status is “a highly individualized inquiry” whereas the amended 
decision changed this language to read: “a highly context-specific inquiry.” Id. at 539; Glatt II, 491 
F.3d at 386. 
 62 See No. 14. Civ. 6770(AT), 2015 WL 5821629, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015). 
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stantial evidence of common internship policies, which demonstrated that 
many of the Glatt III factors could be answered with “generalized proof.”63 
III. THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY TEST FAILS TO ADDRESS THE REALITIES 
OF THE AVERAGE UNPAID INTERNSHIP 
Unpaid interns are in a unique and lamentable position because they often 
lack the resources to bring claims for unpaid wages, attorneys refuse to take 
such cases, or the interns decide not to bring such claims because it will reflect 
poorly on their reputation, possibly damaging their career.64 In addition, most 
unpaid internships involve menial tasks and provide little educational value.65 
This is not to imply, however, that all unpaid internships should be illegal.66 
Some internships do provide interns with valuable educational experiences.67 
But many do not, and as such, unpaid interns in these unfortunate positions 
should be entitled to minimum wage and workplace protections.68 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See No. 14-cv-8004 (AJN), 2015 WL 5945846, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2015). But see Frati-
celli v. MSG Holdings, L.P., No. 6518 (HBP), 2015 WL 8491038, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) 
(appointing class counsel but denying motions for proposed settlement and class certification, finding 
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to meet Glatt III factors). FLSA claims must be litigated 
under the collective action mechanism, but because most state labor laws do not provide similar 
mechanisms, courts allow state labor law claims to proceed under the class action mechanism of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Sari M. Alamuddin et al., Differences Between Rule 23 Class Actions 
and FLSA § 216(B) Collective Actions; Tips for Achieving Class and Collective Action Certification; 
and Certification Post-Dukes, 890 PRACTISING L. INST. 293, 295 (2012). 
 64 See Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1595 (noting that interns are unlikely to have the means to bring 
actions for unpaid wages); cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that 
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting 
their rights and acknowledging that lawyers likewise have little incentive to take cases that involve 
small sums of money). 
65 See PERLIN, supra note 1, at 66–69 (noting that most internships involve menial tasks and lack 
dedicated training or educational components and providing anecdotal evidence of menial internship 
experiences); Bennett, supra note 2, at 297 (comparing internships to apprenticeships and noting that 
internships rarely include supervision and provide “a less than ideal educational environment”); 
Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1562 (noting that most interns receive “little to no educational benefit” 
from internships); Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, supra note 6 (arguing that many internships do not 
involve educational components). 
 66 Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 206. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. In 2015, in Schuman v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., the Eleventh Circuit held that a student-
registered nurse anesthetist enrolled in a training program was not an employee, finding that modern 
internships are different from traditional employment positions in that students, not employers’ busi-
ness requirements, drive the need for internships. 803 F.3d 1199, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015). Employers 
do, however, receive considerable business benefits from the work performed by interns. See David C. 
Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 225 (2002) (describ-
ing one study, which estimated that employers gain an annual $40 million in illegal employment from 
unpaid interns); see also supra note 17 (noting that companies such as Disney hire thousands of in-
terns every year). True, interns take unpaid positions in the hopes of advancing their careers, but, 
presumably, employers would not continue to offer unpaid internships if the interns did not produce 
value for the companies. See id. 
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The primary beneficiary test, as articulated and applied by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit on January 25, 2016 in Glatt v. Fox Search-
light Pictures, Inc. (Glatt III), fails to account for the lack of educational value 
in the majority of unpaid internships.69 The rationale of the primary benefi-
ciary test is that workers who obtain educational benefits from their internships 
have thereby received de facto compensation, while those who obtain no edu-
cational benefit should receive compensation just like any other worker.70 Alt-
hough the “primary beneficiary” test is a step in the right direction because it 
focuses the inquiry on the educational benefits of the internship, the test is un-
necessarily subjective.71 It requires a discrete quantification of the value re-
ceived by each party to the internship arrangement, which is inherently a sub-
jective and difficult calculation and will lead to unpredictable results.72 
In 1947, in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that “[t]he definition ‘suffer or permit to work’ was obviously not intend-
ed to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or implied 
compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises 
of another.”73 In the context of unpaid internships, the “advantage” referred to 
by the Court is the education gained by unpaid interns during their intern-
ship.74 But unlike the training program at issue in Portland Terminal, most un-
paid internships do not include dedicated educational programs, and the train-
ing received is no different than that provided to normal employees.75 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures (Glatt III), 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that 
the “primary beneficiary” test controls the inquiry of an intern’s employment status); cf. Ortner, supra 
note 4, at 2647 (arguing that the Fact Sheet No. 71 factors require the party offering the internship to 
“act more as an educator than an employer”). 
 70 Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1581 n.130. 
 71 See id. at 1591 (discussing the unpredictable nature of the primary beneficiary test); see also 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures (Glatt I), 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013), vacated, 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures (Glatt III), 811 F.3d 528 (discussing how the primary beneficiary 
test could lead to different classifications for two students in the same internship program). 
 72 See PERLIN, supra note 1, at 67 (discussing how a test that balances the benefits received by 
both parties to the internship would lead to an impossible calculation and produce inconsistent re-
sults). 
 73 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(g)). 
 74 See Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 537–38. 
 75 Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 204 (“Many internships are not only unpaid, but also 
provide no explicit academic or training experience, or involve menial work.”); see Portland Termi-
nal, 330 U.S. at 149–50 (noting that the training received by the trainees was necessary for them to be 
hired by the railroad); Donovan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 686 F.2d 267, 268–71 (5th Cir. 1982) (describ-
ing extensive educational programming offered to airline’s trainees). The trainees in American Air-
lines were enrolled in a four to five week, full-time training program, similar to that in Portland Ter-
minal, in order to learn how to become flight attendants or reservation sales agents for American Air-
lines. Am. Airlines, 686 F.2d at 268–70. In contrast, many other interns “famously shuttle coffee in a 
thousand newsrooms, Congressional offices and Hollywood studios . . . .” PERLIN, supra note 1, at xi. 
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Structured programming and mentoring within an unpaid internship is the 
best way for employers to provide their interns with educational value.76 Simp-
ly offering college credit in lieu of pay, however, should not be an appropriate, 
or legal, alternative.77 In Glatt III, after holding that the primary beneficiary 
test controls the employee inquiry, the Second Circuit found that the district 
court’s analysis failed to adequately take into account the educational benefit 
the plaintiffs received from their internships.78 The court noted that all of the 
plaintiffs were enrolled in or had recently completed their post-secondary edu-
cations, contrasted with the plaintiffs in Portland Terminal, whose work was 
not tied to any educational institution.79 This distinction, however, is misguid-
ed because even if internships are completed for college credit, interns may not 
be the primary beneficiary of the arrangement.80 For example, they may per-
form tasks necessary for the operation of the employer’s business, they may 
not learn skills applicable across an industry, or the internship may not com-
plement their formal education.81 
The primary beneficiary test is subjective and over-individualized, which 
will lead to unpredictable results in future analogous cases.82 The qualitative 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 193 (explaining that the more an internship program is 
structured to provide a “classroom or academic experience,” the more likely it is to be viewed as an 
extension of or complement to the intern’s formal education). A paid employee would undoubtedly 
receive compensation if they were given training on new technology or training due to a change in 
their duties, such as a promotion. Yamada, supra note 68, at 234. An unpaid intern would likely go 
through the same process of learning employer-specific skills but would not receive compensation. 
See id. (suggesting that “the cost of getting a foot in the door must be borne by the worker herself”). 
 77 See Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 202 (noting that academic credit alone does not guar-
antee employment status, especially when an internship lacks training); Opinion Letter from Barbara 
R. Releford, Office of Enforcement Policy, Fair Labor Standards Team, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 17, 
2004), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/2004/2004_05_17_05FLSA_NA_internship.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5DL6-GWL8] (finding for-credit marketing internship program potentially subject 
to FLSA where interns worked up to ten hours a week collecting marketing data). 
 78 See Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 537–38 (noting that the primary beneficiary test, as opposed to the 
district court’s reliance on Fact Sheet No. 71, better takes into account the intern’s formal education). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 202 (“[F]ederal regulators state that providing aca-
demic credit alone does not necessarily free employers from paying interns, or provide assurance that 
the internships comply with law, especially when an internship involves little training and mainly 
benefits the employer.”). 
 81 Cf. Opinion Letter from Daniel F. Sweeney, Office of Enforcement Policy, Fair Labor Stand-
ards Team, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 8, 1996), 1996 WL 1031777, at *1 (opining that an unpaid 
intern is not an employee under the FLSA where the internship is academically-oriented and in fur-
therance of the intern’s formal course of study). 
 82 See Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 539 (finding that the question of an intern’s employment status is a 
“highly context-specific inquiry”). Compare Tart v. Lions Gate Entm’t Corp., No. 14-cv-8004 (AJN), 
2015 WL 5945846, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2015) (granting preliminary approval of class and collec-
tive action settlement and finding that the plaintiff interns provided substantial evidence of common 
internship policies, which demonstrated that many of the Glatt factors could be answered with “gener-
alized proof” (quoting Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (Glatt II), 791 F.3d 376, 386–87 (2d Cir. 
2015), superseded and amended by Glatt III, 811 F.3d 528)), with Klein v. Octagon, Inc., No. 14. Civ. 
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benefits received by completing an internship are hard, if not impossible, to 
quantify.83 A legal standard should provide predictability and equity of results 
in order to provide stability to the judicial system.84 Without predictability and 
equity, potential litigants would be dissuaded from bringing meritorious cases 
because they are unable to predict the outcomes.85 Application of the Second 
Circuit’s primary beneficiary test will produce inconsistent and unpredictable 
results.86  
Instead of a subjective, particularized balancing test, a better test would 
be one that objectively determines whether an internship program provides an 
unpaid intern with structured educational programs, materials, and industry-
specific, as opposed to employer-specific, training.87 A set of factors to consid-
er could be as follows: (1) whether the employer has a specific, defined, and 
regular internship program;88 (2) whether an internship program focuses on a 
classroom or other educational experience as opposed to the company’s pro-
cess;89 (3) whether an internship program provides interns with knowledge and 
expertise applicable to a number of employers, rather than only the internship 
                                                                                                                           
6770(AT), 2015 WL 5821629, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (finding plaintiff intern did not present 
sufficient evidence to meet the “generalized proof” standard from Glatt (quoting Glatt II, 791 F.3d at 
386). 
 83 Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1591. 
 84 Id. at 1598. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Glatt I, 293 F.R.D. at 532 (finding that the primary benefit test is “subjective and unpredicta-
ble”); Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1599 (arguing that an appropriate test would provide consistency 
and predictabiliy). 
 87 See Glatt I, 293 F.R.D. at 532–33 (noting that Glatt and Footman received little educational 
training from their Searchlight internships); Magaldi & Kolisnyk, supra note 5, at 204 (inferring that 
because certain internships contain only administrative duties, they do not provide adequate educa-
tional value to the interns). 
 88 See Tart, 2015 WL 5945846, at *4 (finding that the common internship policies alleged by the 
plaintiffs demonstrated that many of the Glatt III factors could be answered with “generalized proof” 
(quoting Glatt II, 791 F.3d at 386–87)); see also Pryor v. Aerotek Sci., LLC, 278 F.R.D. 516, 531 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that the predominance requirement of Rule 23 is more likely to be satisfied 
if the conduct complained of is the result of a common practice). If an employer does not have a regu-
lar internship program, it likely does not hire many interns, and therefore the number of plaintiffs is 
likely not large enough to constitute a class action. See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935–36 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (finding that a presumption that joinder is impracticable can arise where the prospective 
class consists of forty members or more). 
 89 See JANE OATS & NANCY LEPPINK, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TRAINING AND EMP’T GUIDANCE 
LETTER NO. 12-09, JOINT GUIDANCE FOR STATES SEEKING TO IMPLEMENT SUBSIDIZED WORK-
BASED TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 8 (Jan. 29, 2010), http://wdr.doleta.gov/
directives/attach/TEGL/TEGL12-09acc.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W6X-PX2Q]; see also Gregory, supra 
note 16, at 204 (explaining that if an internship has a demonstrable “nexus” to an intern’s education, 
courts will likely find it acceptable under the FLSA). The DOL issues guidance letters to provide 
assistance to states that may be considering implementation of subsidized work-based training initia-
tives for unemployed workers and describing how to create training programs that conform to the 
FLSA. See OATS & LEPPINK, supra, at 1 (providing guidance to states considering implementation of 
work-based training programs). 
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provider;90 (4) the extent to which the work performed by interns is an im-
portant part of the employer’s business operations;91 (5) the likelihood that the 
internship program displaces regular employees;92 and (6) the length of the 
internship program.93 All of these factors need not be met and one is not neces-
sarily more important than the others.94 
The factors incorporate elements from Fact Sheet No. 71, Glatt III, and 
other sources.95 What is unique, however, is that the factors proposed herein 
direct a court to focus on the internship program itself, rather than the individ-
ual aspects of each plaintiff-intern’s experience.96 This expanded inquiry is 
necessary to allow for class certification but will also still require plaintiffs to 
plead with particularity facts of common practices in an internship program in 
order to satisfy a standard of “generalized proof” and meet accepted principles 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Reich v. Parker Fire Prot. Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that a train-
ing program may be similar to a vocational school if skills taught are transferrable within an industry); 
OATS & LEPPINK, supra note 89, at *8 (noting that the more a training program is centered around a 
classroom, the more likely it will be found not to be an employment arrangement under the FLSA); 
Magaldi & Kolisnyk supra note 5, at 193 (same). 
 91 See Edwards v. Cmty. Enters., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1098 (D. Conn. 2003) (enumerating 
this provision in the context of a home-share provider). In 1998, the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York decided Archie v. Grand Central Partnership, in which then-district judge 
Sonia Sotomayor found that homeless persons hired by a non-profit organization were employees 
under the FLSA, in part because they received minimal training and their job duties were specific to 
the non-profit organization at issue in the case. See 997 F. Supp. 504, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). This fac-
tor would ensure that unpaid interns are not performing work that the company relies on for its opera-
tion, and thus, that the company does not rely on unpaid interns for its workforce. Cf. PERLIN, supra 
note 1, at 62 (describing how startup companies implement interns into their business plans to save 
money). 
 92 See FACT SHEET NO. 71, supra note 30, at 1 (providing this factor). 
 93 See McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding one-week training 
program not subject to FLSA); Opinion Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Acting Adm’r, Wage and 
Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_
04_06_12_FLSA.htm [https://perma.cc/C4QT-LQKW] [hereinafter Opinion Letter] (finding not-for-
credit internship program where interns shadowed employers for one week and performed little, if any 
work besides observation was not subject to FLSA). A long-term internship program may be an indi-
cation that the employer is attempting to skirt the FLSA and use unpaid interns for essential business 
operations. See Opinion Letter, supra (inferring that because short-term interns were not found to be 
employees, a long-term internship program is more likely in violation of the FLSA); see also Schu-
mann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2015) (observing that an intern-
ship need not exactly match the timing of an intern’s formal education, but an internship that is 
“grossly excessive” in length is evidence of an employment relationship). 
 94 Cf. Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 537 (noting that the seven factors are not exhaustive and explaining 
that all of the factors need not be met in order to establish an employment relationship); Schumann, 
803 F.3d at 1214 (noting that the outcome of the primary beneficiary test “may not necessarily be an 
all-or-nothing determination”); FACT SHEET NO. 71, supra note 30, at 1 (noting that an employment 
relationship does not exist if all of the factors are met). 
 95 See Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1562 (advocating for a test that mixes the “primary beneficiary” 
test with the factors from Fact Sheet No. 71). 
 96 See Glatt II, 791 F.3d at 386 (noting that the “proper test” is one that recognizes that the deter-
mination of an intern’s employment status is a “highly individualized inquiry”). 
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of class action certification.97 Focusing a reviewing court’s inquiry on the in-
ternship program itself will also create an incentive for employers to craft in-
ternships that provide unpaid interns with a more complete and transferrable 
educational experience, which will benefit both interns and employers.98 In-
terns will better supplement their classroom educations and be better prepared 
for the workforce.99 In turn, employers will have access to a pool of potential 
workers who are trained in the employers’ industries, as opposed to being 
trained for employer-specific tasks.100 
CONCLUSION 
In Glatt III the Second Circuit instituted an overly subjective “primary 
beneficiary” test when it vacated and remanded the district court’s order find-
ing that unpaid interns were employees under the FLSA and therefore, entitled 
to compensation. Further application of the primary beneficiary test in the un-
paid internship context will prove an unpredictable undertaking. Congress or 
the U.S. Supreme Court should enumerate an objective test that focuses solely 
on the formal, educational components of a internship in order to ensure that 
aggrieved unpaid interns can form a class action and that they receive, at the 
very least, a minimum wage salary and basic workplace protections. 
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 97 See Glatt III, 811 F.3d at 538 (noting that the predominance requirement of Rule 23 requires 
“generalized proof”). 
 98 See PERLIN, supra note 1, at xiv (noting that employers favor candidates with internship expe-
rience); Ortner, supra note 4, at 2617 (noting the importance of obtaining work experience prior to 
graduating). 
 99 See Chrysler, supra note 14, at 1567–68 (noting that employers are looking to hire students 
with real-world skills and on-the-job training). 
 100 See Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152–53. 
